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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that much of the debate on choosing an exchange rate regime misses the boat. It
begins by discussing the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes, and then explores
the weaknesses in this theory, especially when it is applied to emerging market economies. It then
discusses a range of institutional traits that might predispose a country to favor either fixed or
floating rates, and then turns to the converse question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime
may favor the development of certain desirable institutional traits. The conclusion from the analysis
is that the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the
development of good fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic
success in emerging market countries. This suggests that less attention should be focused on the
general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable, and more on these deeper
institutional arrangements. A focus on institutional reforms rather than on the exchange rate regime
may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have
seen in recent years.
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  In recent years, a number of emerging market countries have experienced devastating 
financial crises and macroeconomic turbulence, including Argentina (2001-2002), Turkey (2000-
2001), Ecuador (1999), Russia (1998), east Asia (1997), Mexico (1994-95), and even Chile (1982). 
In the ensuing post-mortems, an active debate has followed over how the choice of exchange rate 
regime might have contributed to macroeconomic instability – and conversely, how a shift in 
exchange rate regime might contribute to improved macroeconomic performance.  Should an 
emerging market economy prefer a floating exchange rate, a fixed exchange rate, or some blend 
of the two like an exchange rate that was usually fixed but might sometimes shift?  
  Many countries used to choose an intermediate path: that is, an exchange rate that was 
often stabilized by the central bank, but might sometimes shift, often known as a “soft peg.” 
However, in the aftermath of the macroeconomic crisis across east Asia in 1997-98, a view emerged 
that this exchange rate regime was in part responsible for the depth of the macroecononomic 
crisis. The governments of Thailand, Malaysia, South Korea, and other nations in that region had 
kept exchange rates fixed. There was no explicit institutional guarantee that the exchange rate 
would remain fixed, but the rates had been stable for long enough that local financial institutions 
borrowed in dollars abroad and then loaned freely in U.S. dollars to domestic borrowers. But 
when a surge of foreign investment stopped, the existing exchange rate became unsustainable. 
For example, when the Thai baht collapsed against the U.S. dollar, Thai borrowers were 
completely unable to repay their dollar-denominated loans – and in turn Thai financial 
institutions were nearly all insolvent.  This meltdown of the financial sector led to an enormous 
economic contraction. 3
  Thus, one often-told lesson of the east Asian experience is that nations must make a 
bipolar choice: either choose a framework for credibly guaranteeing a fixed exchange rate, 
known as a “hard peg,” or else accept a freely floating exchange rate.
1 Yet neither of these 
extreme exchange rate regimes has an unblemished record. 
  There are two basic ways a government can offer a credible guarantee of a fixed exchange 
rate: a currency board and full dollarization.  In a currency board the note-issuing authority, whether 
the central bank or the government, fixes a conversion rate for this currency vis-à-vis a foreign 
currency (say U.S. dollars) and provides full convertibility because it stands ready to exchange 
domestically issued notes for the foreign currency on demand and has enough international reserves 
to do so. Full dollarization involves eliminating the domestic currency altogether and replacing it 
with a foreign currency like the U.S. dollar, which is why it is referred to as dollarization, although it 
could instead involve the use of another currency like the euro.  This commitment is even stronger 
than a currency board because it makes it much more difficult -- though not impossible -- for the 
government to regain control of monetary policy and/or set a new parity for the (nonexistent) 
domestic currency. 
  Argentina, for example, chose the currency board approach for ensuring a fixed exchange 
rate.  Indeed, Argentina even recognized that full backing of the monetary base may not be 
enough, because that would leave the banking system without a lender of last resort or a situation 
where the government might need additional credit, so the Argentines also paid for contingent 
credit lines.  From a legal perspective, the central bank of Argentina was highly independent. But in 
1 For a discussion of the why soft pegs have fallen out of favor and the rise of the bipolar view, see 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Eichengreen and Masson (1998), and Fischer (2001) in this journal. 4
2001, large budget deficits (including contingent government obligations, like supporting state-
owned banks) forced the Argentine government to look for a new source of funds. After Domingo 
Cavallo became Minister of the Economy in April 2001, the supposedly independent central bank 
president, Pedro Pou, was forced to resign. Soon after, Argentina’s prudential and regulatory regime 
for its financial sector, which had been one of the best in the emerging market world, was weakened. 
 Banks were encouraged and coerced into purchasing Argentine government bonds to fund the fiscal 
debt.  An attempt was made to reactivate the economy via expansive monetary policy. With the 
value of these bonds declining as the likelihood of default on this debt increased, bank's net worth 
plummeted.  The likely insolvency of the banks then led to a classic run on the banks and a full-scale 
banking crisis by the end of 2001.  Because most debt instruments in Argentina were denominated 
in U.S. dollars, the depreciation of the Argentinean currency made it impossible for borrowers to 
earn enough Argentinean currency to repay their dollar-denominated loans. The Argentine 
financial sector melted down, and the economy as well.  Argentina’s experiment with its 
currency board ended up in disaster. 
  The remaining option of freely floating exchange rates seems unattractive as well. Without 
further elaboration, “floating exchange rate” means really nothing other than that the regime will 
allow for some exchange rate flexibility.  It rules out a fixed exchange rate regime but nothing else.  
A country that allows a floating exchange rate may pursue a number of very different monetary 
policy strategies: for example, targeting the money supply, targeting the inflation rate, or a 
discretionary approach in which the nominal anchor is implicit but not explicit (the “just do it 
approach”, described in Mishkin, 1999b, 2000 and Bernanke et al., 1999). But regardless of the 5
choice of monetary regime, in many emerging market economies, exports, imports, and 
international capital flows are a relatively large share of the economy, so large swings in the 
exchange rate can cause very substantial swings in the real economy. Even a central bank that would 
prefer to let the exchange rate float must be aware that, if the country’s banks have made loans in 
U.S. dollars, then a depreciation of the currency vs. the dollar can greatly injure the financial system. 
Under these circumstances, the monetary authority is likely to display “fear of floating” (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2002), defined as a reluctance to allow totally free fluctuations in the nominal or 
real exchange rate, which Mussa (1986) showed are very closely linked.   
  Thus, the literature on exchange rate regimes seems to have backed itself into a corner where 
none of the available options is without problems. In this paper, we argue that much of the debate on 
choosing an exchange rate regime misses the boat. We will begin by discussing the standard theory 
of choice between exchange rate regimes, and then explore the weaknesses in this theory, especially 
when it is applied to emerging market economies. We discuss a range of institutional traits that 
might predispose a country to favor either fixed or floating rates, and then turn to the converse 
question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime may favor the development of certain 
desirable institutional traits. Overall, we believe that the key to macroeconomic success in emerging 
market countries is not primarily their choice of exchange rate regime, but rather the health of the 
countries fundamental macroeconomic institutions, including the institutions associated with fiscal 
stability, financial stability and monetary stability.  In general, we believe that less attention should 
be focused on the general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable, and 




The Standard Theory of Choosing an Exchange Rate Regime  
  
Much of the analysis of choosing an exchange rate regime has taken place using the 
theory of optimal exchange rate regimes -- and its close relative the theory of optimal currency 
areas -- which owes much to Mundell (1961) and Poole (1970).  Models of choosing an 
exchange rate regime typically evaluate such regimes by how effective they are in reducing the 
variance of domestic output in an economy with sticky prices.   
If an economy faces primarily nominal shocks – that is, shocks that arise from money 
supply or demand – then a regime of fixed exchange rates looks attractive. If a monetary shock 
causes inflation, it will also tend to depreciate a floating exchange rate and thus transmit a 
nominal shock into a real one. In this setting, the fixed exchange rate provides a mechanism to 
accommodate a change in the money demand or supply with less output volatility.   
On the other hand, if the shocks are real – like a shock to productivity, or to the terms of 
trade (that is, the relationship between export prices and import prices shifts due to movements 
in demand or supply) – then exchange rate flexibility of some sort becomes appealing. In this 
case, the economy needs to respond to a change in relative equilibrium prices, like the relative 
price of tradables with respect to nontradables. A shift in the nominal exchange rate offers 
speedy way of implementing such a change -- thus, ameliorating the impact of these shocks on 7
output and employment (De Grauwe, 1997).  On the other hand, if a downturn is driven by real 
factors in an economy with a fixed exchange rate, the demand for domestic money falls and the 
central bank is forced to absorb excess money supply in exchange for foreign currency.  The 
result is that (under perfect capital mobility) the decrease in the demand for domestic money 
leads to an automatic outflow of hard currency and a rise in interest rates. In this case, the hard 
peg contributes to increasing the depth of the downturn. 
  This standard model of choosing an exchange rate regime offers some useful insights. 
However, it ultimately fails to address a challenge issued by Mundell himself in his original 
1961 paper and many of the underpinnings of the model do not apply especially well to 
emerging market economies.   
 
The Mundell Challenge   
In Robert Mundell’s original 1961 paper on optimum currency areas, Mundell pointed 
out that this theory implies that the optimality of fixed exchange rates within a given country 
cannot be taken for granted.  Why should Texas and New York in the United States, or Tucuman 
and Buenos Aires in Argentina, share the same currency?  These regions are hit by different real 
shocks and would, according to the standard theory, benefit by the extra degree of freedom 
provided by having their own currencies and allow them to float against each other.  We will call 
this deep observation the “Mundell challenge.”  
The usual response to the Mundell challenge is that a country has internal mechanisms 
that can substitute for regional exchange rate variability, including labor mobility between 8
regions and compensatory fiscal transfers from the central government. However, these 
arguments are only partially persuasive. Fiscal transfers, in contrast to currency devaluation, do 
not change relative prices.  Moreover, labor mobility is a poor substitute for exchange rate 
flexibility.  Imagine the social costs of having to ship people from Texas to New York, when a 
simple movement in the exchange rate would have restored equilibrium. 
Indeed, the Mundell challenge cuts even more deeply. After all, why should exchange 
rate flexibility be limited to large regions like New York or Texas? Why not have differing 
exchange rates between cities, or neighborhoods? Indeed, why not move to a world of complete 
contingent contracts, with no money at all, and thus in effect have a different flexible exchange 
rate for every transaction? Of course, no one has pushed the theory to this implausible extreme.  
However, not doing so implies acknowledging the existence of other factors that are key and, 
actually, dominate the factors emphasized by the theory of exchange rate regimes.    
An important set of such factors relate to the observation that modern economies have 
not yet been able to function without some kind of money. The fundamental functions of money 
are to reduce transactions costs and to address liquidity concerns, functions which are especially 
valuable in a world with seriously incomplete state-contingent markets. A common currency is a 
useful coordinating mechanism within a national economy, even if it can sometimes go awry. 
Similarly, a fixed exchange rate may be a useful mechanism for an economy, even if that country 
faces differential real shocks, because the gains from reducing transactions costs and providing 
liquidity are great enough. Thus, in choosing an exchange rate regime, it is not enough to 
analyze the nature of the shocks. The potential benefits from fixed exchange rates must be taken 9
into account, too. 
 
The Realities of Emerging Market Economies  
  The standard framework for choosing an exchange rate regime is based on a number of 
implicit assumptions that do not apply well to many emerging economies. The standard theory 
presumes an ability to set up institutions that will assure a fixed exchange rate, but after the 
experience of Argentina, this assumption of an institutional guarantee seems improbable. The 
standard theory assumes that a time-consistent choice is made on the exchange rate regime, when 
in many countries the exchange rate regime may frequently shift. In the standard model of 
exchange rate choices, the focus is on adjustments in goods and labor markets and the financial 
sector is thoroughly ignored. However, no recent macroeconomic crisis in an emerging market 
has been free from financial turmoil of one form or another. Finally, as mentioned a moment 
ago, the standard exchange rate model pays no attention to transaction costs and liquidity 
considerations that are essential to explain why money should exist in the first place. This issue 
is especially severe for emerging market economies, where the lack of contingent contracts is 
more severe than in advanced economies.  
  To illustrate the shortcomings of the standard model of choosing an exchange rate regime 
for emerging markets, and also to highlight some of the main issues in making such a choice, it 
is useful to identify several institutional features that are common in emerging market 
economies: weak fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions; currency substitution and liability 
dollarization: and vulnerability to sudden stops of outside capital flows.  10
Weak fiscal, financial and monetary institutions make emerging market countries highly 
vulnerable to high inflation and currency crises.  A key lesson from the “unpleasant monetarist 
arithmetic” discussed in Sargent and Wallace (1981) and the recent literature on fiscal theories of the 
price level (Woodford, 1994 and 1995) is that irresponsible fiscal policy puts pressure on the 
monetary authorities to monetize the debt, thereby producing rapid money growth, high inflation and 
downward pressure on the exchange rate.  Similarly, poor regulation and supervision of the financial 
system can result in large losses in bank balance sheets that make it impossible for the monetary 
authorities to raise interest rates to control inflation or prop up the exchange rate because doing so 
would likely lead to a collapse of the financial system.  Also a frail banking system can produce 
fiscal instability, and hence high inflation and devaluations, because the need for a bailout can imply 
a huge unfunded government liability (Burnside, Eichengreen and Rebelo, 2001).  Weak monetary 
institutions in which there is little commitment to the goal of price stability or the independence of 
the central bank mean that the monetary authorities will not have the support or the tools to keep 
inflation under control or to prevent large depreciations of the currency.   Thus in  
an economy where the government may run up enormous fiscal deficits, banks are poorly 
regulated, and the central bank may recklessly expand the money supply, the real value of money 
cannot be taken for granted. 
Firms and individuals in emerging market countries react to the threat that their money 
may dramatically change in value – either through inflation or the exchange rate – by turning to 
currency substitution, where they use a foreign currency for many transactions (Calvo and Végh, 
1996).  Currency substitution is likely to be due not only to past inflationary experience resulting 11
from weak monetary, fiscal and financial institutions,.but also to the fact that a currency like the 
U.S. dollar is a key unit of account for international transactions.  This phenomenon induces the 
monetary authority to allow banks to offer foreign exchange deposits – that is, a firm in 
Argentina can deposit U.S. dollars directly in an Argentine bank without converting to local 
currency.
2   
Foreign exchange deposits induce banks—partly for regulatory reasons that prevent 
banks from taking exchange rate risk—to offer loans denominated in foreign currency, usually 
U.S. dollars, leading to what is called liability dollarization.  Liability dollarization leads to an 
entirely different impact of a sharp currency devaluation in an emerging market (Mishkin, 1996; 
Calvo, 2001).  In emerging market countries, a sharp real currency depreciation creates a 
situation where those who have borrowed in U.S. dollars are unable to repay. The money they 
are earning is in local currency, but their debts are in U.S. dollars. Thus the net worth of 
corporations and individuals falls, especially those whose earnings are primarily in local 
currency. The result is many bankruptcies and loan defaults, a sharp decline in lending and an 
economic contraction. Liability dollarization may become a major problem for countries where 
the level of dollar borrowing has been especially high and where the economy is relatively 
closed so that most parties earn only in local currency, as has recently been the case in several 
emerging market countries (see Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2002).  However, not all emerging 
market countries suffer from liability dollarization in a serious way; for example, Chile and 
2  In this fashion, a sudden switch away from domestic and into foreign money need not result in 
a bank run, since in the presence of foreign exchange deposits, such a portfolio shift could be 
implemented by simply changing the denomination of bank deposits.  Otherwise, deposits would be 
drawn down to purchase foreign exchange, resulting in a bank run. 12
South Africa, which have stronger monetary, fiscal and financial institutions, are commonly 
cited exceptions (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2002). 
Vulnerability to large negative changes in capital inflows, which often have a largely 
unanticipated component (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000), also contribute to susceptibility to 
currency and financial crises.  Table 1 shows the incidence of these “sudden stops” over the last 
decade.   Table 1 shows that this phenomenon is mostly confined to emerging market countries 
and is more likely to be associated with large currency devaluations in these countries, probably 
because of their weak fiscal and financial institutions. (The precise definition of a sudden stop 
and large devaluations are found in the note to the table.)   In addition, preliminary evidence 
suggests that there is a high degree of bunching of sudden stops across emerging market 
countries.  This is especially evident after the Russian 1998 crisis, and the recent Wall Street 
scandals that included Enron and other firms.  This pattern leads us to conjecture that, to a large 
extent, sudden stops have been a result of factors somewhat external to emerging market 
countries as a group.  In this symposium, Kaminsky and Reinhardt discuss how the process of 
contagion occurs.  
  The links from weak institutions and sudden stops to currency substitution and liability 
dollarization – and then the links from liability dollarization to a collapse balance sheets and 
economic downturn – naturally differ from country to country.
3 But currency depreciations and 
3  Among the factors that differ across countries, we would like to mention the problem of tax evasion.  
As a result of tax evasion, the tax base of many emerging market economies is very small, the informal 
sector large and, thus, any adjustment to shocks causes major distortion in the formal part of the economy, 
leading to capital flight.  Effects could be large if resulting externalities give rise to multiple equilibria 
(Calvo, 2002). 
 13
sudden stops bring about large changes in relative prices, and have a deep impact on income 
distribution and wealth (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2002).  In addition, the sudden stop is 
typically associated with a sharp fall in growth rates if not outright collapse in output and 
employment. A floating exchange rate is clearly the wrong prescription for this situation, since it 
allows the sharp depreciation that cripples balance sheets and the financial sector. But under the 
dual stresses of weak institutions and sudden stops, it is not clear that a fixed exchange rate is 
sustainable, either. Rather than focusing on the choice of exchange rate regime, the appropriate 
answer to this situation would seem to be an improvement in fiscal, financial, and monetary 
institutions. Such an improvement would limit the amount of currency substitution and liability 
dollarization, and also make the economy more resilient in reacting to sudden stops when they 
occur.  In other (more graphic) words, “it’s the institutions stupid.” 
 
Choosing Between Exchange Rate Regimes 
  
No exchange rate regime can prevent macroeconomic turbulence. But the choice of 
exchange rate regime can be better or worse suited to the economic institutions and 
characteristics of an economy. In the discussion that follows, we will focus primarily on the 
overall choice between fixed and floating exchange rates. However, it is worth remembering that 
exchange rate regimes come in a wide variety of arrangements: currency boards, dollarization, 
soft pegs, crawling bands, free floating, and many others. Moreover, a floating exchange rate 
regime can be accompanied by a number of different domestically oriented monetary policies 14
(inflation targeting, monetary targeting, or a “just do it” discretionary approach.) 
  
The Ability to Have Domestic Monetary Policy 
  The strongest argument in favor of a floating exchange rate regime is that it retains the 
flexibility to use monetary policy to focus on domestic considerations.  In contrast, a hard 
exchange rate peg leaves very narrow scope for domestic monetary policy, because the interest 
rate is determined by monetary policy in the anchor country to which the emerging market 
country has pegged.  However, in emerging market economies, this argument is more relevant in 
some institutional contexts than others. 
  One difficulty that emerging market economies face is that their capital markets are 
geared to interest rates set in major financial centers.   Frankel, Schmukler and Serven (2002) 
show, for example, that in Latin America all interest rates reflect changes in U.S. interest rates 
and, furthermore, that countries that do not peg to the dollar see their interest rates change by a 
larger factor than those that do.  In addition, emerging market economies may be hit as a group 
with financial contagion, as noted earlier, which will affect their interest rates. The central bank 
in an emerging market country thus faces real practical difficulties.  
  Moreover, although a floating exchange rate raises the theoretical possibility for domestic 
monetary authorities to pursue countercyclical monetary policy, the central bank may not 
possess this capability in practice.  If the monetary authorities have little credibility in terms of 
their commitment to price stability, then monetary policy may be ineffective.  For a central bank 
without inflation-fighting credibility, an expansionary monetary policy will only lead to an 15
immediate jump in interest rates and/or the price level.   
  Building credible monetary institutions is a difficult task. It requires a public and 
institutional commitment to price stability. Some of this commitment can be expressed through laws 
and rules that assure the central bank will be allowed to set the monetary policy instruments without 
interference from the government, that the members of the monetary policy board must be insulated 
from the political process, and that the central bank is prohibited from funding government deficits.  
There is a large literature on the forms that central bank independence can take (for example, 
Cukierman, 1992), but what is written down in the law may be less important than the political 
culture and history of the country.  The contrast between Argentina and Canada is instructive here.  
Legally, the central bank of Canada does not look particularly independent.  In the event of a 
disagreement between the Bank of Canada and the government, the minister of finance can issue a 
directive that the bank must follow.  However because the directive must be specific and in writing, 
and because the Bank of Canada is a trusted public institution, a government override of the bank is 
likely to cost the ruling party heavily in the polls. Thus, in practice the Bank of Canada is highly 
independent.  In contrast, the central bank of Argentina was highly independent from a legal 
perspective.  However, this did not stop the Argentine government from forcing the resignation of 
the highly respected president of the central bank and replacing him with a president who would do 
the government's bidding.  It is unimaginable in countries like Canada, the United States or in 
Europe, that the public would tolerate the removal of the head of the central bank in such a manner, 
and indeed we do not know of any case of this happening in recent history.
4   
4 The stability of the central bank in advanced countries may be partly explained by the size of the shocks, 
rather than by some advantage in the political culture. After all, except for the Great Depression, 16
  Many emerging market countries, like Argentina, have had a history of poor support for the 
price stability goal, and laws supporting central bank independence in these countries are easily 
overturned.  It is therefore important for such countries to develop genuine public and political 
support for central bank independence as well as legal independence in order to have the ability to 
successfully conduct domestic monetary policy. 
  If an emerging market country is able to develop fiscal, financial and monetary institutions 
that provide credibility for society’s pursuit of price stability, then monetary policy can be used to 
stabilize the economy. Still, not all emerging market countries are up to this task, and so they may 
decide to choose a hard exchange rate peg instead.  (However, the absence of strong institutions may 
make it difficult for them to sustain the hard peg.) 
  This interdependence between institutions and exchange rate regimes helps to explain the 
general empirical finding that whether a country has a fixed or flexible exchange rate tells us little 
about whether it has higher economic growth or smaller output fluctuations. Indeed, when you look 
more closely at which emerging market countries have successful macroeconomic performance, the 
exchange rate regime appears to be far less important than deeper institutional features of the 
economy relating to fiscal stability, financial stability and the credibility of monetary institutions that 
promote price stability.
5  However, there is some evidence that floating exchange rate regimes can 
advanced countries have not been hit by equally large shocks as in Argentina and other emerging market 
economies.  
5 Indeed, Tommasi (2002) has argued that even deeper institutions, relating to politico-institutional rules 
as reflected in the constitution, electoral rules and informal practices of the polity, are crucial to the 
development and sustainability of strong fiscal, financial and monetary institutions.  Also, Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) provide evidence that deeper, fundamental institutions are 
more crucial to lowering economic volatility and raising growth than are specific macroeconomic 
policies. 17
help countries cope with terms-of-trade shocks and might promote economic growth (Broda, 2001 
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger, 2003).  
 
Reducing Inflation 
  Just as the main advantage of a floating exchange rate may be that it allows the monetary 
authorities some discretion and flexibility to use monetary policy to cope with shocks to the 
domestic economy, the main weakness of a floating exchange rate may be that it allows too much 
discretion to monetary policy and so may not provide a sufficient nominal anchor (for example, 
Calvo, 2001; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000).   
  Of course, many emerging market countries have been able to keep inflation under control 
with flexible exchange rate regimes and this is why the evidence on whether fixed versus floating 
exchange rate regimes are associated with lower inflation rates on average is not clear cut (e.g., 
Edwards and Magendzo, 2001 and Reinhart and Rogoff (2002)).   But a central bank can only work 
to reduce inflation if it is supported by the public and the political process. In some countries, giving 
the central bank an explicit focus on inflation targeting can help focus the public debate so that it 
supports a monetary policy focus on long-run goals such as price stability (Bernanke et al., 1999).  
However, these benefits require excellent communication skills on the part of the central bank in 
what can be a swirling political environment in emerging market countries.  
 
A Misaligned Exchange Rate?  
  One danger of a hard exchange rate peg is the risk of being locked into a misaligned 18
exchange rate, which can be defined as a sizable difference between its actual level and the one 
to which “fundamentals” would dictate.  This possibility supports the case for flexible exchange 
rates, but again the situation is more complex than it may at first seem.  
  Even in a country with a fixed nominal exchange rate, it is possible to use taxes and 
subsidies on imports and exports to alter the effective real exchange rate. For example, a uniform 
tax on imports accompanied by a uniform subsidy on exports of the same size is equivalent to a 
real currency depreciation – even though the nominal exchange rate stays unchanged. Moreover, 
a tax-and-subsidy-induced fiscal devaluation has one built-in advantage over nominal 
denomination. The fiscal devaluation has an upper bound, determined by the fact that beyond a 
certain point tax evasion becomes rampant.  Nominal devaluation, on the other hand, has no 
upper bound and can lead to high inflation.  
  But fiscal devaluation may be difficult to implement in a timely and effective manner 
without well-run fiscal institutions. For example, politicians may be quick to impose a tax on 
imports out of protectionist sentiment, happy to use a fiscal devaluation as an excuse, but then 
slow to remove that import tax later when the reason for the devaluation has evaporated.  
 
Expanding the Gains from Trade 
  A hard exchange rate peg will tend to promote openness to trade and economic 
integration (Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000). For example, an exchange rate fixed to the 
U.S. dollar will likely promote trade with the United States and other countries tied to the U.S. 
dollar.  Fixed exchange rates or even a common regional currency as in the European Monetary 19
Union (EMU) may help regional economic integration in the context of a common currency may be 
an attractive project (this point is also discussed further below in connection with the effect of 
exchange rate regimes on institutions). Thus, countries which are seeking to expand trade would 
naturally place a higher value on some form of a fixed exchange rate with a trading partner..   
  Along with gains from trade, an economy that is more open to trade may also be less 
susceptible to sudden stops. An expansion of trade means that a greater share of businesses are 
involved in the tradable sector.  Because the goods they produce are traded internationally, they are 
more likely to be priced in foreign currency, which means that their balance sheets are less exposed 
to negative consequences from a devaluation of the currency when their debts are denominated in 
foreign currency.  Then, a devaluation which raises the value of their debt in terms of domestic 
currency is also likely to raise the value of their assets as well, thus insulating their balance sheets 
from the devaluation.
6   Moreover, the more open is the economy, the smaller will be the required 
real currency depreciation following a sudden stop (Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi, 2002).   
Reducing the Risk Premium in Interest Rates 
  Advocates of hard exchange rate pegs suggest that it can reduce the currency risk component 
in domestic interest rates, thus lowering the borrowing costs for both the government and the private 
sector and improving the outlook for financial deepening, investment and growth. Some, such as 
Schuler (1999), have even gone so far as to suggest that dollarization will allow domestic interest 
rates in emerging market countries to converge to those in the United States 
  However, the risk of government default and the related risk of confiscation of private assets 
6 If traded goods are not denominated in the same foreign currency as the debt, then this insulation may be 
incomplete unless the currency used for denominating debt moves very closely with the currency used for 
denominating traded goods. 20
denominated in both domestic and foreign currency are more likely to be the source of high interest 
rates in emerging market countries than is currency risk. The experience of Ecuador serves to 
illustrate this point. The spread between Ecuador’s sovereign bonds and U.S. Treasury bonds 
remained at high levels in the first half of 2000, even though the government had already 
dollarized in January of the same year. Spreads came down considerably only after the 
government reached an agreement with its creditors in August 2000 that resulted in a substantial 
debt reduction of 40 percent.  Sound fiscal policies which make government defaults extremely 
unlikely are thus essential to getting interest rates to approach those in advanced countries.  Indeed, 
Chile, with its flexible exchange rate regime, has been able to achieve lower interest rates on its 




Flexibility in Wages and Prices 
  It is possible that emerging market economies, with their large informal sectors, have 
greater price and wage flexibility than developed economies. An economy with highly flexible 
wages and prices has less need of a flexible exchange rate.  
  To some extent, the degree of flexibility in wages and prices is controlled by government 
regulation. For example, public sector wages are often a component of the economy that is quite 
inflexible. However, it may be politically palatable to index public sector wages to their 
comparable private sector wages, and thus create greater flexibility. In general, an emerging 
market economy with a greater degree of flexibility in wages and prices will benefit less from 
the additional flexibility of a floating exchange rate. 21
   
Widespread Loans in a Foreign Currency 
  Liability dollarization makes a policy of freely floating exchange rates more difficult to 
sustain. When the monetary authority knows that a currency devaluation can lead to extreme 
stress on the financial sector, it cannot turn a blind eye to exchange rate fluctuations (Mishkin 
and Savastano, 2001).  A large devaluation when there is extensive liability dollarization raises 
the value of the foreign denominated debt, deals a heavy blow to balance sheets, and therefore 
can lead to a full-fledged financial crisis (Mishkin, 1996).
7  
  The extent of liability dollarization is partly affected by government financial regulatory 
policy. For example, regulations can help to ensure that financial institutions match up any foreign-
denominated liabilities with foreign-denominated assets, and thus reduce currency risk. But even 
when the banks have equal foreign-denominated (dollar) assets and liabilities, if banks dollar assets 
are loans to companies in dollars who themselves are unhedged, then banks' are effectively 
unhedged against currency devaluations because the dollar loans become nonperforming when the 
devaluation occurs; for discussion of how this problem occurred in Mexico, see Mishkin (1996) and 
Garber (1999).  Thus limiting currency mismatches may require additional government policies to 
limit liability dollarization or at least reduce the incentives for it to occur.  If a country wishes to 
choose a floating exchange regime, it would be wise to implement financial regulatory policies to 
discourage currency mismatches and liability dollarization.
8 For example, both Chile and Argentina 
7  Furthermore, it may induce the government to provide subsidized hedging instruments, which could 
substantially increase fiscal imbalance (this was the case in Brazil after the 1999 large devaluation of the 
real), impairing credibility.  
8 However, the possible costs of pursuing such a policy also have to be taken into account. The literature 22
experienced a sudden stop after the 1998 Russian crisis, but the impact on the Chilean economy was 
relatively small because Chile’s stronger fiscal, financial and monetary institutions has resulted in 
much less liability dollarization. 
 
International Reserves 
  A hard peg exchange rate system, like a currency board, may require a substantial war 
chest of international reserves.  It may seem that a floating exchange rate system could avoid the 
cost of these reserves, but this would be too simple.  
  Many large emerging market economies like Mexico, Chile, and Brazil, which have a 
floating exchange rate and have announced a domestic monetary policy aimed at targetting 
inflation, also have large international reserves. Indeed, they occasionally hold international 
reserves in excess of monetary base.  Because of these large reserves, it could be said that such 
countries “float with a large life jacket.”  Why do large reserves appear to be necessary even 
with floating exchange rates? One explanation is that international reserves provide collateral for 
public bonds issued in connection with open market operations.  Another explanation is that 
even a nation with a floating exchange rate must be concerned about the possibility of a run on 
its currency. Finally, policymakers in emerging market economies are very sensitive to the 
exchange rate because many such economies often exhibit a high pass-through coefficient; that 
is, devaluation often leads to inflation (González, 2000;  Hausmann, Panizza and Stein, 2001). 
  Thus, nations with a domestically oriented monetary policy and floating exchange rates 
on Liability Dollarization is still in its infancy and, thus, it is hard to tell whether these costs are 
significant (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2002; Jeanne, 2002). 23
also have good reasons to carry high reserves, and it does not appear that they typically have 
much smaller reserves than nations with fixed exchange rates.  
 
Lender of Last Resort 
  A hard exchange rate peg is sometimes said to be at a disadvantage relative to a floating 
exchange rate regime because it cannot accommodate a money-printing lender of last resort.  
While this argument would seem to weaken the case for fixed exchange rates, the scope for a 
lender of last resort for emerging market countries with floating rates is oversold (Calvo, 2001; 
Mishkin, 1999a, 2001).   
  In advanced economies, the monetary authority can issue liquidity to bail out the banking 
system but this extra liquidity is expected to be soaked up by open market operations in the near 
future, so that bank bailouts can stabilize the banking system with little if any inflationary 
consequences.  In contrast, in emerging market countries, central bank lending to the banking 
system in the wake a financial crisis—characterized by a sudden stop in capital inflows—is likely to 
unleash fears of an inflationary explosion and produce a sharp exchange rate depreciation.  If there is 
substantial liability dollarization, the depreciation will then have a major negative impact on private 
sector balance sheets, which will then promote even more financial instability.  
  This discussion reemphasizes an earlier lesson. If monetary institutions are well-developed 
and the central bank has sufficient credibility, only then can the central bank act as a lender of last 
resort. Alternatively, a government can secure contingent credit lines (like the central bank of 
Argentina did during the so-called Convertibility Program), but these credit lines can be very 24
expensive and may not be sufficient when a crisis hits.  
 
Shifts from Fixed to Floating Regimes 
  Even if a country might be better served in the long run by adopting a floating exchange 
rate regime, the timing of the shift from a peg can have serious economic consequences. The 
costs of shifting from a fixed exchange rate regimes to a floating regime under conditions of 
economic stress, like a sudden stop, are especially striking. As discussed earlier, a move from a 
fixed to a floating exchange rate regime in the midst of a sudden stop is likely to exacerbate the 
crisis.  The initial devaluation which raises the value of foreign-denominated debt can cause 
widespread destruction of corporations’ and household balance sheets, which sends the economy 
into a devastating downward spiral. Recent papers by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002) and 
Jeanne (2002) also suggest that de-dollarization (the reestablishment of a domestic currency) 
may require a major overhaul of the domestic financial sector. Development of the necessary 
institutions to support a successful domestically oriented monetary policy takes time.  
 
Can Exchange Rate Regimes Improve Economic Institutions? 
 
  The discussion in the preceding section focuses on what institutional traits or policy concerns 
should cause a country to prefer fixed or floating exchange rates. But the possibility of reverse 
causation also deserves consideration. Perhaps the choice of exchange rate regime should not be 
analyzed as a response to existing institutional traits, but instead as a potential cause of preferred 25
institutional outcomes. Research on theories of institutional development in emerging market 
countries is in its early stages, but is developing rapidly.
9  But several intriguing hypotheses about 
how exchange rate regimes may improve institutions have been proposed.  
  Advocates of hard exchange rate pegs argue that they improve fiscal institutions and trigger 
sounder budgetary management, because if the central bank is focused on a fixed exchange rate, 
then the government no longer has access to the money printing press to finance its spending (for 
example, Hanke and Schuler, 1994).  As the recent example of Argentina suggests, where the fiscal 
tensions between the provinces and the central government were not solved by the currency board, 
hard pegs may be less effective at constraining fiscal policy than was previously believed.  Hard 
pegs may even weaken incentives for governments to put their fiscal house in order, because the 
hard peg may make it easier for governments to borrow foreign funds, thus allowing them to delay 
necessary reforms to fix fiscal imbalances.  For example, Panama (which has been dollarized for 
close to a hundred years) has had poor fiscal performance, with fiscal deficits over 7 percent in the 
1970s and averaging 5 percent in the 1980s – it is just in recent years that the fiscal position has 
improved to the point that the fiscal surplus averaged 1.4 percent during the 1990s.  On the other 
hand, it is not clear that in floating exchange rate systems, the conduct of monetary policy has any 
particular impact in promoting fiscal responsibility. However, one might argue that a floating 
exchange rate, particularly if it involves the government in setting an inflation target, has the 
potential to promote government transparency and fiscal responsibility. 
  Advocates of hard pegs (e.g. Hausmann, 1999) also suggest that dollarization promotes a 
9 For example, see La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Vishny and Shleifer (1998), Shleifer and Vishny 1999) 
and Boone, Breach, Friedman and Johnson (2000). 26
healthier financial system because it avoids currency mismatches and deepens the financial system, 
making it less prone to crisis.  However, there is little evidence to support this view (Eichengreen, 
2002).  On the other hand, a hard exchange rate peg in the form of a currency board might encourage 
unhedged dollar (foreign-denominated) liabilities that non-financial and financial firms might be 
willing to undertake, thus making the financial system more vulnerable in case the system has to be 
abandoned, as illustrated by Argentina in 2002.  The hard peg might also encourage the issuance of 
dollar liabilities because financial firms would believe that the government would feel responsible 
for any devaluation and would, thus, be more likely to offer a bail-out (McKinnon and Pill, 1999; 
Broda and Levy-Yeyati, 2000).  However, the evidence that floating rate regimes lead to less 
liability dollarization is quite weak (Honig, 2003). After all, on its face a floating exchange rate 
would seem to encourage holding some assets in several different currencies as a form of 
diversification. For example, Peru, with its floating exchange rate regime has a tremendous amount 
of liability dollarization, while Brazil when it had a quasi-fixed exchange regime rate in the period of 
1994 to 1999 did not.   
  Can the choice of exchange rate regime help improve monetary institutions that enable the 
monetary authorities to build credibility? If a fixed exchange rate regime is constructed with a full 
array of supporting institutions, then it would seem to offer at least a gain in credibility – although 
after the collapse of Argentina’s fixed rate system, such credibility will always remain incomplete.  
Moreover, a floating exchange rate can be a mechanism for monetary credibility as well, Tornell 
and Velasco (2000) argue, because the foreign exchange market will anticipate the effects of 
policy inconsistency by devaluing the exchange rate, providing a clear signal that something is 27
rotten.  Moreover, the signal itself could help establish some discipline in government’s quarters 
and possibly lead to a timely rectification of policy inconsistencies (Mishkin, 1998). 
  Although at the outset, the credibility of the monetary authorities might be weak and the 
public support for central bank independence may not be all that strong, adoption of inflation 
targeting might help the central bank to work to produce “constrained discretion” (Bernanke and 
Mishkin, 1997) in which transparent discussion of the conduct of monetary policy and 
accountability of the central bank for achieving its inflation target might make it more difficult 
for the central bank to follow overly expansionary monetary policy.   In addition, over time it 
may help obtain credibility for the central bank as it did in Chile, and it may also increase support 
for the central bank independence.  Indeed, Mishkin and Posen (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) 
suggest that the support for central bank independence in the United Kingdom was a direct result of 
the inflation targeting regime.  However, although inflation targeting might help with central bank 
credibility and support for central bank independence to some extent, a fair degree of support for 
good monetary institutions already needs to be present if inflation targeting is to have a chance of 
success. 
  There is some evidence that hard exchange rate pegs, particularly those in currency unions, 
do encourage openness to trade and integration with the countries to which the currency is pegged  
(Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000).  As we mentioned earlier, trade openness can reduce the 
vulnerability of emerging markets to financial crises, while economic integration with an anchor 
country reduces the cost of the loss of domestic monetary policy with a hard peg.   
  The possible connections between exchange rate regimes and the improvement of economic 28
institutions is a potentially important topic for future research.  
 
The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Context 
 
  When choosing between exchange rate regimes, one size does not fit all (or always). This 
argues against international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank and other development banks having a strong bias toward one type of exchange rate regime. 
Instead, an informed choice of exchange rate regime requires a deep understanding of a country’s 
economy, institutions, and political culture.  
  Indeed, we believe that the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order 
importance to the development of good fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in producing 
macroeconomic success in emerging market countries. Rather than treating the exchange rate regime 
as a primary choice, we would encourage a greater focus on institutional reforms like improved bank 
and financial sector regulation, fiscal restraint, building consensus for a sustainable and predictable 
monetary policy, and increasing openness to trade.  A focus on institutional reforms rather than on 
the exchange rate regime may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to 
the crises than we have seen in recent years. 29
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Table 1 
The Incidence of Sudden Stops (SS), 1992-2001 
Number of episodes 
   Emerging Developed
Event Type  Markets Economies 
  Devaluations associated with SS  12  4 
      Of which:  First SS, then devaluation          8          2 
        First devaluation, then SS          4          2 
  Devaluations not associated with SS  7  19 
% of total 
   Emerging Developed
Event Type  Markets Economies 
  Devaluations associated with SS  63  17 
      Of which:  First SS, then devaluation         42          9 
        First devaluation, then SS         21          9 
  Devaluations not associated with SS  37  83 
 
Note: A sudden stop is defined as a reversal in capital inflows that i) 
exceeds the mean minus two standard deviations of the annual change in 
capital inflows observed since 1990, and ii) is associated with a decline in 
output.  The exercise also considers rises in the real exchange rate that i) 
exceed the mean plus two standard deviations of the annual change in the 
real exchange rate observed since 1990, and ii) are greater than 20 percent. 
The sample consists of 15 emerging economies and 17 developed countries. 
See Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2003) for further details and some 
sensitivity analysis. 41
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This paper argues that much of the debate on choosing an exchange rate regime misses the boat. It 
begins by discussing the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes, and then 
explores the weaknesses in this theory, especially when it is applied to emerging market economies. 
It then discusses a range of institutional traits that might predispose a country to favor either fixed or 
floating rates, and then turns to the converse question of whether the choice of exchange rate regime 
may favor the development of certain desirable institutional traits. The conclusion from the analysis 
is that the choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the 
development of good fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic 
success in emerging market countries.  This suggests that less attention should be focused on the 
general question whether a floating or a fixed exchange rate is preferable, and more on these deeper 
institutional arrangements. A focus on institutional reforms rather than on the exchange rate regime 
may encourage emerging market countries to be healthier and less prone to the crises that we have 
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